Relative identity by Griffin, Nicholas John
  THESES SIS/LIBRARY        TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 
R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2      FACSIMILE:  +61 2 6125 4063 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY      EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au 
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USE OF THESES 
 
 
This copy is supplied for purposes 
of private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be  
copied or closely paraphrased without the  
written consent of the author. 
RELATIVE IDENTITY 
by 
NICHOLAS GRIFFIN 
This thesis was submitted in partial 
fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Australian National University. 
December, 1974. 
This thesis is my own composition. 
To the best of my knowledge all 
sources have been acknowledged. 
Nicholas Griffin 
ii 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My major debt of gratitude is to Riahard Routley who gave 
help far beyond the aall of supervision. He read through 
and aommented with metiauloue aare on various initial drafts 
and the entire final draft. Hie aritiaieme have affeated 
not merely the details but the entire etruature and direat-
ion of the thesis, and hie influenae is felt on every page. 
I am grateful also to my other supervisors, Peter Sheehan 
(who introduaed me to the topia), Robert Brown and Stephen 
Voss for adviae, enaouragement, aesietanae, aritiaiem and 
aontroverey variously mireed. In partiaular, Stephen Voss 
has read the whole and provided me with more pages of 
aommente than either he or I aare to remember. 
Apart from my supervisors a number of people at A.N.U. 
have helped me greatly by their aommente: in partiaular, 
Peter Herbst, Brenda Judge, Peter Mahlh9usler, Malaolm Rennie, 
Peter R8per and Peter Smith. In addition; I've had the 
benefit of aomments on earlier drafts from Geoffrey Collins 
of GonvilZe and Caius College, Cambridge. 
Several authors were kind enough to send me unpublished 
work and I am happy to thank them here: Dr. Tyler Burge 
(University of California); Dr. Carl Calvert (University of 
Washington); Professor Jaak Nelson (Temple University); Dr. 
Rose Poole (Maaquarie University); Dr. Leslie Stevenson 
(University of St. Andrews); Professor Gerald Vision (Temple 
University) and Dr. John Woods (Viatoria University, Canada). 
Finally thanks are due to Cheryl Griffin for tea and 
sympathy as well as for help with the bibliography. 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
The work defends a theory of reZative identity roughZy 
simiZar to Geach's. It is heZd that statements of the 
form 'a is the same as b' are incompZete untiZ a generaZ 
noun is specified after 'same'; and that items which are 
identicaZ with respect to one generaZ noun may be distinct 
with respect to another. These theses are referred to 
respectiveZy as (D) and (R). Chapter One contrasts the 
theory of absoZute identity with theories of reZative 
identity, pZaces the Zatter in their historicaZ context, 
and suggests why they have some initiaZ pZausibiZity despite 
the universaZ acceptance of the absoZute theory. Chapters 
Two, Three, Four and Five concern the nature of the generaZ 
nouns which may be used to compZete identity statements. 
We are particuZarZy concerned with generaZ nouns which 
convey criteria by which identity cZaims may be judged 
and with the structure of the system of cZasses which these 
nouns name. Certain over-simpZe assumpt,ions of Wiggins' 
about this structure are rejected in Chapter.Five. Chapters 
Six and Seven consider the thesis (D): in conjunation with 
(R) in Chapter Six, and independentZy in Chapter Seven~ 
WhiZst {R) does not entaiZ (D), as has often been supposed, 
it is convenient to accept both principZes in a context-
free, (R )-re Zative identity theory in or1der to obtain 
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a aloser matah with natural language identity statements 
than is possible for the absolute theory. In Chapter 
Seven it is argued that whilst Wiggins' theory, whiah 
exaludes (R} but inaludes (D), aannot be proven false 
it represents no more than a new way of stating the 
absolute theory and aan be made redundant by Perry's alter-
native theory whiah keeps the alassiaal identity operator. 
In Chapter Eight various general objeations to (R} are 
rejeated: arguments whiah seek to show that relations 
whiah satisfy (R) fail aertain aonditions on identity 
relations. Forms of symmetry, transitivity and reflexivity 
and a non-Leibniz substitutivity prinaip~e are developed 
for (H)-relative identities. On the other hand, Geaah's 
general argument in favour of (H)-relative identity as a 
means of keeping one's ontology minimal is rejeated on 
familiar grounds. Chapters Nine and Ten deal with 
partiaular examples of (H). In Chapter Nine it is main-
tained that ~)-relative identity theoPy solves the problem 
of aonstitutivity and resolves its assoaiated 'paradoxes' 
suah as the ship of Theseus. It is demonstrated that 
arguments to show that the relation between an item and its 
aonstituents is not identity are based on absolutist 
prinaiples. In Chapter Ten the standard absolutist treat-
ment of examples of (H) is rejeated as invalid. 
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